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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH z 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
vs. : 
GARY L. BOUCK, : Case No. 900122-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Brief of Respondent 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
1. Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of 
Appeals to hear this appeal by Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2) (d) (1953, 
as amended). 
2. This appeal is from a final judgment in the Second 
Circuit Court, Layton Department, wherein a trial by jury was held 
on the 7th day of February/ 1990, with m e Honorable Judge Roger S. 
Dutson presiding. The jury subsequently found the defendant guilty 
as charged of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1953, as amended) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trooper's statement that defendant was sitting 
in the car, together with the driver's license information, 
adequately identify the defendant? 
2. Did the trooper engage in an improper procedure which 
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renders his testimony unreliable? 
3. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, 
was there sufficient evidence to support conviction? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the statutory provisions upon which the 
State relies are included in the body of this brief and are 
included verbatim in the addendum. 
Constitutional provisions relied upon: 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI: 
In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
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impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been compmitted, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to 
secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his 
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a criminal case wherein the 
defendant was charged with and found guilty of Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol, a violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1953, 
as amended). 
The case was tried by a jury on the 7th day of February, 
1990, in the Layton Department of the Second Circuit Court, with 
the Honorable Judge Roger S. Dutson presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 1:20 a.m. on July 16, 1989, the 
defendant's vehicle was observed by Trooper Jon Cady of the Utah 
Highway Patrol, parked in the median between the north and 
southbound lanes of Interstate 15, near Burton's Lane in Davis 
County, Utah. 
As the defendant came out of the vehicle, Trooper Cady 
asked the defendant for his driver's license, which he did produce. 
(T. 3, 7) 
Following the performance of the field sobriety tests, 
Trooper Cady arrested the defendant, Gary L. Bouck, whom he 
identified by means of his pictured Utah driver's license, and 
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transported him to the Davis County Jail to administer an 
intoxilyzer test. 
Trooper Cady cited the defendant, Gary L. Bouck, for 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §41-6-44 (1953, as amended), and the defendant was tried 
several months later and found guilty of the offense as charged. 
During the trial, the trooper testified that he received 
from "defendant" a Utah driver's license. (T. 3) He further stated 
the identity of the individual on the driver's license was Gary L. 
Bouck, with an address of 1490 South Roberta Street. (T. 3) In 
addition, during the trial the following exchange took place: 
Q: Okay. When you initially went up to the car, was the 
engine running? 
A: No. It was not. 
Q: Who was in the car? 
A: The defendant. 
Q: Only the defendant? 
A: Just the defendant. 
Q: And what was his position in the car? 
A: Behind the driver's steering wheel in the left front 
side of the vehicle. 
(T. 5, line 25 through T. 6, line 9) 
Defense counsel did not cross-examine the witness on the 
issue of identity, but did move to dismiss at the close of the 
State's case, based on the absence of an identification. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
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The sole issue before this Court is whether an "in-court" 
identification of the defendant is required to support a jury-
verdict. 
The defendant's summary of argument attempts to create 
three issues from a single observation, that observation being that 
Trooper Cady did not point out the individual seated at defense 
counsel table as being the same Gary L. Bouck arrested and cited on 
July 16, 1989. 
The defendant was properly identified by Trooper Cady at 
the time and place of the defendant's arrest by use of a driver's 
license obtained from the defendant. 
The circumstances under which the defendant was identified 
at the time were not suggestive or unfair. Defendant was 
identified at the scene. The issues raised in State v. Myers, 570 
P.2d 1252 (Arizona 1977), and Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), 
do not apply in this fact situation since there is no evidence of 
unfair police conduct which resulted in rendering an unreliable 
identification by an eyewitness. 
Based on the well-established standard of review on appeals 
on sufficiency of the evidence, this Court should view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the verdict. The verdict should 
therefore be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TROOPER SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFIED THE DEFENDANT 
AT TRIAL BY REFERRING TO THE DEFENDANT AS THE 
PERSON BEHIND THE WHEEL OF THE CAR, AND FURTHER BY 
TESTIFYING ABOUT THE DRIVER'S LICENSE INFORMATION. 
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Appellant alleges that Trooper Cady improperly identified 
the defendant as the person guilty of Driving Under the Influence 
of Alcohol, Appellant fails to indicate clearly how his rights 
were violated, how he was denied due process, or denied any other 
specific right. The most pertinent portions of the referenced 
constitutional provisions seem to be those which guarantee a 
defendant the right to confrontation. In this case, the defendant 
was afforded that right. Trooper Cady, the complaining witness 
against the defendant, appeared for the prosecution and the 
defendant had the opportunity to confront, to cross-examine, and to 
challenge testimony. Defendant also had the assistance of counsel 
in doing so. 
Appellant claims in his brief that the "trial court erred 
in it's decision to convict the Defendant by not recognizing the 
failure of the prosecution to provide a specific in-court 
identification of the defendant." This statement does not appear 
to rely on any constitutional guarantee. Rather, it seems to 
depend on an assertion that such an identification is required, 
without providing any authority for the requirement. The defendant 
cites the case of State v. Myers, supra, and quotes: 
It is essential that the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the identification 
indicate that the defendant has not been 
mistakenly identified. 
In Myers, however, the facts are much different than those 
in the case now before this Court. In this case, however, there is 
nothing to show that "the totality of the circumstances" hints at 
a misidentification. The cited case does not state than an "in-
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court" identification is necessary to prevent misidentification, 
but rather that "the primary concern of the law is that the 
identification be reliable." 
In State vs. Jollev, 571 P.2d 582 (Utah. 1977), the issue 
of "in-court" identification was addressed. There the court states 
that, 
Appellant would have us believe that the 
constitutional protection afforded the accused by 
his right to be confronted by his witnesses 
requires that each witness point a finger at him 
and say, "He's the one." That is not so. Article 
1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution merely 
means that the accused may see the witnesses in 
order to make any objections he may have, and to 
exercise the opportunity to cross-examine them. 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently 
held that the constitutional clause is satisfied 
if there is an adequate opportunity for cross-
examination, even in the absence of physical 
confrontation. 
There is no evidence that an "in-court" identification is 
necessary. The requirement is that the identification be reliable 
and, in this case, there is no suggestion that the defendant, Gary 
L. Bouck, was not reliably identified by Trooper Cady as the person 
guilty of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. 
Appellant cites State vs. Hill, 520 P. 2d 618 (Wash 1974) 
for the proposition that the prosecution bears the burden of 
establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the identify of the accused 
as the person who committed the offense. In Hill, the defendant 
claimed the evidence of identification wc~ insufficient because no 
specific "in-court" identification was made. The court held, 
however, that the evidence was adequate to establish identification 
where "the defendant was present in the courtroom at all pertinent 
times throughout the course of the trial, during which there were 
numerous references in the testimony to "the defendant" and to 
"Jimmy Hill." The arresting officer testified that it was "the 
defendant" whom he observed at the scene. Hill, at 619. 
Similarly in Dillon vs. State, 508 P.2d 652 (Okl. Cr. 
1973), the Court upheld the sufficiency of the identification of 
the defendant where the transcript reflected the identity of the 
defendant and his presence at trial, even though no specific "in-
court" identification was made. 
POINT II. 
THE IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES FOLLOWED BY THE 
TROOPER DID NOT RENDER HIS TESTIMONY UNRELIABLE 
The defendant states that the procedures used to identify 
Gary L. Bouck were unduly suggestive, citing as authority Neil v. 
Biggers# supra. Biggers deals with suggestive police procedures 
where an eyewitness makes the identification after the crime has 
been committed. The evil to be prevented is misidentification 
which results in arrest or issuance of charges based on an 
unreliable line-up or show-up procedure. The facts of this case do 
not involve any such procedure. In this case, Trooper Cady 
identified and arrested the defendant at the scene of the incident. 
If the jury had concluded, after observing the defendant 
sitting at the table with the defense attorney and conversing with 
him during the trial, and being referred to as both "the defendant" 
and "Mr. Bouck" without comment that he was Gary L. Bouck, it would 
not constitute reversible error. The purpose of the trial was to 
determine the guilt of the defendant, Gary L. Bouck, who was 
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charged with Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol on July 16, 
1989, not to determine the identity of the individual that counsel 
chose to have sit with him at the defendant's table. The jury 
found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Gary L. Bouck was guilty as 
charged. It is not certain that the jury even considered the 
question of whether Gary L. Bouck was the person seated with the 
defense counsel. If that person was not Mr. Bouck, then it seems 
that the defendant voluntarily surrendered his right to be present 
and confront witnesses. 
Pursuant to Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (1990), the defendant may voluntarily absent himself from 
trial and the trial can proceed without him so long as it is not a 
prosecution for an offense punishable by death. The procedural 
requirement is that the defendant be given notice of the time for 
trial. His absence shall not prevent the case from being tried and 
a verdict or judgment entered there shall have the same effect as 
if defendant had been present. Even if the defendant wants to be 
present, the court may exclude him for good cause shown which may 
include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct. 
In Capwell v. State, 686 P.2d 1148 (Wyo. 1984), the 
defendant voluntarily absented himself from the trial and then 
contended that his conviction should be reversed because neither 
the victim nor any witness adequately identified him in court as 
the perpetrator of the crime charged. The court stated that such 
an identification was unnecessary, that "[i]t is only necessary 
that the person committing the crime be identified as the person 
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charged in the indictment or information." The court also observed 
that "[t]he method of identification used in a criminal trial is a 
matter largely within the discretion of the trial court." 
In the instant case, when the identification issue was 
raised by defendant's counsel (T.8, line 10) the court stated, "I 
think it's an issue that the jury can decide." That issue, along 
with the rest of the case, was submitted to the jury for decision 
and that decision was a verdict finding Gary L. Bouck guilty. 
POINT III. 
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE JURY 
VERDICT, THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION 
WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT CONVICTION 
The defendant states in his brief that it "is fundamental 
law that the defendant be present for his trial and have the 
opportunity to confront witnesses." It is arguable whether this 
is, in fact, fundamental law, but it is more pertinent to observe 
that there was no denial of a right to be present and to confront 
witnesses. Contrary to defendant's assertion, an "in-court" 
identification is not required to enable a defendant to cross-
examine witnesses and the defendant's counsel did conduct an 
apparently uninhibited cross-examination of the prosecution's 
witness. 
The issue raised in defendant's POINT III, however, is 
supposedly one of insufficient evidence and not one concerning 
restrictions on cross-examination. This court has adopted the 
following standard of review with regard to a challenge for 
sufficiency of the evidence: 
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In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, 
this Court must view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the verdict and will interfere 
only when the evidence is so lacking and 
insubstantial that a reasonable person would not 
possibly have reached a verdict beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Jamison, 99 Utah Adv. 
Rpt. 32, 34 (1989), quoting State v. Tanner, 675 
P.2d 539, 550 (Utah 1983) 
The jury heard the testimony of Trooper Cady during this 
trial and, obviously, concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant, Gary L. Bouck, had been proven guilty. The Trooper's 
testimony included evidence as to the identification he made when 
he arrested the defendant and transported him to the Davis County 
Jail. It is ludicrous to claim that because Trooper Cady did not 
physically point at the defendant in court and proclaim, "That is 
him!", that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to 
convict. 
CONCLUSION 
The only matter or issue to be considered is whether it was 
necessary to have an "in-court" identification of this defendant as 
part of the trial process. 
There are, of course, cases in which identity is truly an 
issue and it must be established in a reliable manner. In this 
case, identity was never truly an issue. The trooper established 
the identity of the defendant and testified that he had done so at 
trial. The jury heard the testimony and concluded that the 
defendant, Gary L. Bouck, was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The issue of identity has been raised by the defendant solely in 
connection with the "in-court" identification of the person who sat 
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at the defense table during trial. There was no question raised as 
to the identification made by Trooper Cady on July 16, 1989, of the 
arrested individual as the named defendant, Gary L. Bouck. 
The defendant argues that the prosecution failed to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the person sitting at the counsel 
table was the same person who was arrested for Driving Under the 
Influence. The prosecution hereby observes that it is not required 
to prove at all, much less beyond a reasonable doubt, who might be 
seated at the counsel table. Is there a requirement to point to 
the person seated at the defendant's table with the defense counsel 
and identify him as being the defendant? The answer is that there 
is no such requirement, and the verdict reached by the jury in this 
case should be upheld. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thlsL_S^ day of JULY 1990 
^ ^ A M > ^ 
James E. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1953, as amended) et sea. 
B. Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(d) (1953, as amended) 
C. Rule 17(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1990) 
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A. Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1953, as amended) et seq. 
41-6-44, Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug or 
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentra-
tion — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol 
— Criminal punishment — Arrest without war-
rant — Penalties — Suspension or revocation of 
license. 
(1) (a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any 
person to operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this 
state if the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 
grams or greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours 
after the alleged operation or physical control, or if the person is under 
the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol 
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) (a) Every person who is convicted the first time of a violation of Subsec-
tion (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. But if the person has inflicted a 
bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the 
vehicle in a negligent manner, he is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that of simple negli-
gence, the failure to exercise that degree of care which an ordinarily 
reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or similar circum-
stances. 
(4) In addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), the court 
shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less 
than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours, with emphasis on serving 
in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to work in a community-
servite work program for not less than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours and, 
in addition to the jail sentence or the work in the community-service work 
program, order the person to participate in an assessment and educational 
series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction within five years after a first conviction 
under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section 
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court shall, in addi-
tion to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose a mandatory 
jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than 720 
hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require 
the person to work in a community-service work program for not less than 
80 hours nor more than 240 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence or 
the work in the community-service work program, order the person to 
participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol 
rehabilitation facility. The court may, in its discretion, order the person 
to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within five years after a second con-
viction under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this sec-
tion adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court shall, in 
addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose a manda-
tory jail sentence of not lesp^han 720 nor more than 2,160 hours with 
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to 
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor 
more than 720 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence or work in the 
community-service work program, order the person to obtain treatment 
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(c) No portion of any sentence imposed under Subsection (3) may be 
suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation 
until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. Probation 
or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation of this section or a 
local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Subsec-
tion 41-6-43(1) may not be terminated and the department may not rein-
state any license suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction, if it is 
a second or subsequent conviction within five years, until the convicted 
person has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that all 
fines and fees, including fees for restitution and rehabilitation costs, as-
sessed against the person, have been paid. 
(6) (a) The provisions in Subsections (4) and (5) that require a sentencing 
court to order a convicted person to: participate in an assessment and 
educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility; obtain, in 
the discretion of the court, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility; 
or obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility; or 
do any combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a violation of 
Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subsection (7). The 
court is required to render the same order regarding education or treat-
ment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, or both, in connection with a 
first, second, or subsequent conviction under Section 41-6-45 that quali-
fies as a prior offense under Subsection (7), as the court would render in 
connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent 
conviction requirements of Subsections 41-6-44(4) and (5). 
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction under Section 
41-6-45 which qualified as a prior conviction under Subsection (7), is a 
first, second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous 
conviction under either this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a 
prior conviction. 
(c) Any alcohol rehabilitation program and any community-based or 
other education program provided for in this section shall be approved by 
the Department of Social Services. 
(7) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a 
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under 
Subsection 41-6-43(1) in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an original 
charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state for the 
record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or not there had 
been consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
defendant in connection with the offense. The statement is an offer of 
proof of the facts which shows whether there was consumption of ?lcohol 
or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, in connection with 
the offense. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea of-
fered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of Section 
41-6-45 as follows. If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no 
contest to a charge of violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor states 
for the record that there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combi-
nation of both, by the defendant in connection with the offense, the result-
ing conviction is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5). 
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section 
41-6-45 which is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5). 
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person ior a violation of 
this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(9) The Department of Public Safety shall suspend for 90 days the opera-
tor's license of any person convicted for the first time under Subsection (1), 
and shall revoke for one year the license of any person convicted of any subse-
quent offense under Subsection (1) if the violation is committed within a 
period of five years from the date of the prior violation. The department shall 
subtract from any suspension or revocation period the number of days for 
which a license was previously suspended under Section 41-2-130, if the previ-
ous suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of 
conviction is based. 
B. Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(d) (1953, as amended) 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
• • • 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
• • • 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, 
except those from the small claims department of 
a circuit court; 
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C Rule 17(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1990) 
Rule 17. The trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel. The defendant shall be 
personally present at the trial with the following exceptions: 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and 
infractions, defendants may consent in writing to 
trial in his absence; 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not 
punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary 
absence from the trial after notice to defendant 
of the time for trial shall not prevent the case 
from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered 
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant 
had been present; and 
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a 
defendant from trial for good cause shown which 
may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous 
conduct. 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require 
the personal attendance of the defendant at the trial. 
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